We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of both a contestant's type and e ort. We analyze the optimal reward for the designer when the reward is either multiplicatively separable or additively separable in e ort and type. In the multiplicatively-separable environment, the optimal reward is always positive, while in the additively-separable environment, it may also be negative. If the designer maximizes total e ort, in both environments, for su ciently large number of contestants, the optimal reward decreases in the contestants' e ort. However, if the designer maximizes the highest e ort, the optimal reward may increase in the contestants' e ort for any number of contestants. Finally, we allow for the possibility of multiple rewards and nd that in both environments, the designer's payo depends only upon the expected value of the e ort-dependent rewards and not the number of rewards.
Introduction
The Ansari X-prize was a ten-million-dollar competition created to jumpstart the space tourism industry by attracting the attention of the most talented entrepreneurs and rocket experts in the world. The cash prize was awarded to the team headed by Burt Rutan and Paul Allen who were the rst to privately nance, build and launch a spaceship able to (a) carry three people to 100 kilometers (62.5 miles), (b) return safely to earth, (c) repeat
We wish to thank seminar participants at University of Exeter, University of Bonn, and WZB-Berlin and acknowledge helpful comments by Benny Moldovanu and Roland Strausz.
y Kaplan: Department of Economics, University of Exeter, UK. Cohen, Sela: Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel. Corresponding Author: Sela, anersela@bgu.ac.il.
the launch with the same ship within two weeks. The X-prize was inspired by the early aviation prizes of the 20th century, primarily the spectacular trans-Atlantic ight of Charles Lindbergh in the Spirit of St. Louis which captured the $25,000 Orteig prize in 1927.
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The X-prize competition is an example of an R&D contest in which all contestants including those that do not win any prize incur costs as a result of their e orts but only the winner gets the prize. These winner-take-all contests appear in many di erent forms: only the rst to invent gets a patent, the hedge fund that nds the arbitrage opportunity the quickest gets the rewards, the rst to cross the nish line wins a marathon, only one worker may get the promotion. In many cases, the sponsor has at least a limited control over the design used: the government can determine scope and length of patents, the SEC can regulate hedge funds, the organizers of the marathon can set the size of the prize, and the company can set rules with a promotion contest.
This potential control has led to research in contest design. Initial research in contest design found advantages to limiting the number of contestants (see Baye et al., 1993 , Taylor, 1995 , and Fullerton & McAfee, 1999 . A di erent approach to contest design is restricting the contestants' strategies. Che and Gale (1998), Gavious et al. (2003) and Kaplan & Wettstein (2006) all analyze the pro tability of bid caps. Further investigation into contest design allowed the designer control over the reward structure. Barut & Kovenock (1998) and Moldovanu & Sela (2001) study xed-prize contests, where the designer can determine the number of prizes having positive value and the distribution of the xed total prize sum among the di erent prizes. Che and Gale (2003) give the designer even more freedom by allowing him to design a menu of xed prizes where the contestants choose a prize from the menu and the winner is determined according to the best combination of e ort and prize.
In this paper we go one step further and allow the designer to determine a structure of a variable reward such that there is a relationship between the e orts incurred in the contest and the size of the reward collected by the winning contestant. That is, a larger e ort changes not only the probability of winning the contest but also the size of the reward gained by winning.
2 Such a relationship already exists in many examples of contests: In the X-prize as with patent races, the winning rm choosing a larger e ort leads to an earlier innovation time. This in present value terms leads to a larger reward. A hedge fund not only faces competition from other hedge funds, but from market forces eliminating opportunities.
Earlier detection can lead to larger pro ts. In the marathon, harder training can lead to a quicker winning time. This can result in a larger prize (such as if a course or world record is broken). Also, in work promotions, greater e ort can result in a larger raise to the winner.
We study the optimal reward structure in all-pay contests under incomplete information where the designer wishes to maximize either the total expected e ort or the expected highest e ort. The optimal e ort-dependant reward is not clear-cut. The reward a ects the designer's payo in two ways: indirectly through in uencing the e ort exerted by the contestants and directly by the payments made to the winner. It is important to emphasize that we do not perform a general mechanism design analysis. Instead, we restrict ourselves to a contest (all contestants choose and expend e ort before discovering the winner) and allow the designer the exibility of changing the e ort-dependent reward structure. 3 We nd the equilibrium e ort and the optimal reward in two di erent environments. In both environments the contestants value for winning depends upon both the reward paid by the designer and their type. In our rst environment the value to winning is multiplicativelyseparable in reward and type. In our second environment, the value to winning is additively separable in reward and type. The environments yield similar results: in both of them, if the contest designer wishes to maximize the expected total e ort, for su ciently large number of contestants, the optimal reward function decreases in e ort, that is, a larger e ort decreases the size of the reward gained by winning. On the other hand, in both environments, if the contest designer wishes to maximize the expected highest e ort, for any number of contestants, the optimal reward function may increase in e ort.
Our environments are also distinguished since in the multiplicatively-separable environment the optimal reward is always positive while in the additively-separable environment it may also be negative. Furthermore, in the multiplicatively-separable environment, for every optimal reward function, all contestants choose to participate in the contest. On the other hand, the optimal reward function in the additively-separable environment may limit the number of contestants that choose to participate in the contest. That is the optimal reward function serves the role of entry fees or alternatively reserve prices in the standard contests (auctions). It is interesting to note that the optimal reward does not necessarily eliminate participation of the contestants with the lowest valuations (it never eliminate the contestants with the highest valuations).
Finally, we allow the designer the additional control of the number of e ort-dependent rewards (as mentioned above, this control is analyzed in Barut & Kovenock (1998) and Moldovanu & Sela (2001) ). Contrary to Moldovanu & Sela (2001), we nd that it does not matter upon how many prizes the reward is distributed; only the expected value of the reward matters. We present an example where an optimal design is to give an e ort-dependent prize to the loser of a two-contestant contest. This further shows the consequence of this work { that an e ort-dependent reward can be an e cient tool for the contest designer but its structure as well as its e ects on the contest are sometimes unusual.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In Sections 3 and 4 , we analyze the optimal reward when the contest designer wishes to maximize the expected total e ort and the expected highest e ort, respectively. In Section 5, we revisit the question of multi-prize contests and in Section 6 we conclude. The Appendix contains the proofs.
The model
Consider n player all-pay contests with e ort-dependent rewards. Each contestant's type The timing of decisions is that the designer chooses the reward function and afterwards the contestants see their individual types and choose e ort. We consider here two forms of utility for the designer: (1) the designer maximizes the expected value of total e ort 4 This assumption implies that the value to winning may depend upon type and if so contestants with lower costs also value winning more. The other case where V < 0 can be treated as well, but then the equilibrium does not necessarily exist given the assumption about the cost function. A step further would have a second signal for the value function with a joint distribution over both signals. This would complicate analysis considerably. 5 For instance, the winners of the X prize received additional reward from the 10 million prize in the form of a contract from Virgin to form Virgin Galactic (see www.virgingalactic.com).
E[
x i ] minus the expected reward he must pay out, and (2) the designer maximizes the expected value of the highest e ort E[maxfx i g] minus the expected reward he must pay out. Each contestant chooses his e ort in order to maximize his expected utility given the other contestants' actions and the form of the reward function.
Equilibrium
Consider the equilibrium in the contest that results after the designer sets the reward function. In a Bayesian equilibrium, the e ort function x( ) chosen by each contestant maximizes his expected utility given the e ort functions chosen by the other contestants. Hence, for each ; a symmetric equilibrium e ort function x( ) (assumed to be monotonic increasing and di erentiable with inverse (x)) solves the following pro t maximization problem
Proposition 1 Any equilibrium strategy x( ) is given by the implicit function
while one side of (2) is the expected payo of a contestant of type given this strategy.
Proof. See Appendix.
Notice that if c( ; x) = 0 for all x; and V ( ; R(x)) = x; we have a rst-price auction. From (2), we have ( ) = R F (~ ) n 1 d~ which is consistent with the results of a rst-price auction. If c( ; x) = x for all and V ( ; R(x)) = for all x; we have a standard all-pay auction, again with the aforementioned surplus ( ).
Maximization of the total e ort
In this section, we analyze the case when the designer wishes to maximize the expected value of total e ort. Then, his expected payo is given by
The left term of (3) is the expected total e ort exerted by the contestants and the right term of (3) is the designer' expected payment to the contestant with the highest e ort.
Multiplicatively separable case
We consider rst the multiplicatively-separable case where the value function of each contestant is multiplicatively separable with the form
The equilibrium e ort x( ) is the solution of the following maximization problem arg max
Equivalently, the equilibrium e ort x( ) is also the solution of the problem arg max
whereĉ( ; x) = c( ; x)= . Hence, without loss of generality, 6 we can consider the typeindependent case in which each contestant's value function does not depend on his type and is given by
Proposition 2 Consider a multiplicatively-separable environment and a designer that values the expected total e ort. Then, the optimal reward is given by
whereĉ( ; x) = c( ; x)= and (x) is the inverse of the equilibrium e ort x( ) which is given by
By Equations (6) and (7) we derive some properties of the contestants' equilibrium e orts and the optimal reward in the multiplicatively-separable environment.
Proposition 3
In the multiplicatively-separable environment, when the designer values the expected total e ort, 6 Indeed, c( ; 0) = 0 and c x ( ; 0) = 0 implyĉ( ; 0) = 0 andĉ x ( ; 0) = 0. As well as c x < 0; c xx > 0; c x 2 0 and c x 2 0 implyĉ x < 0;ĉ xx > 0;ĉ x 2 0 andĉ x 2 0. (Generality is in fact gained since the reverse isn't true.)
1. The equilibrium e ort is independent of the number of contestants n.
2. All contestants choose to participate in the contest.
3. The optimal reward is always positive 4. For large enough n; the optimal reward is decreasing.
Proof. Equations (6) and (7) imply points 1,2 and 3. The proof of point 4 is proved in the Appendix.
The main result of Proposition 3 is that for a su ciently large number of contestants, the optimal reward function decreases in e ort, that is, a larger e ort decreases the size of the reward gained by winning. In Example 1 we see that in a contest with as few as six contestants, the reward function can be decreasing. From this speci cation,ĉ(x; ) = x 2 = and we can rewrite (6) as
Thus, the equilibrium e ort is x( ) = 2 2 As in agreement with Proposition 3, the optimal e ort does not depend upon n: The inverse of the equilibrium e ort is (x) = p 2x: By (5) the optimal reward is
For two bidders the optimal reward is R(x) = 2x 3
. For four bidders, we have an e ortindependent optimal reward R(x) = .
From this example, one may have some puzzling questions. Why would a designer want to reward winning contestants less the harder they work? Would this not dampen e ort? The answer to this is that the contestant cares about the expected reward rather than the reward for winning. As we see from the example, the expected value to winning is
2 . This is always increasing.
Here the designer values all e orts whether or not it is the highest and thus the expected payment does not depend upon the number of contestants. Hence, the designer induces e orts independent of n. However, given this as the number of contestants increase, the probability of winning for low e ort decreases at a faster rate than that for higher e ort. Thus, the reward for winning at those e orts must be increased at a faster rate. Eventually, this must cause the reward to be decreasing.
The independence of the equilibrium e ort in the number of contestants becomes clear if we notice that the optimal reward R(x) in the multiplicatively-separable environment when the designer values expected total e ort is comparable to the optimal wage contract in a Principal-Agent (PA) model (with n agents) where the principal o ers each agent a wage w(x) that depends upon output x (which can be sold at a price of one). In the PA model the agent's maximization problem is
The principal's expected payo given the solution x( ) of the agent's problem is the expected output that he receives (the price of which is one) minus the expected wage that he must pay:
The substitution of w(x) R(x) F ( (x)) n 1 yields the same problems of (1) and (3).
The connection between our model and the PA model provides a competitive solution to the classical PA model. Instead of o ering every agent a wage that depends on his output in the PA model, the principle can o er the agents a contest where the agent with the highest e ort wins a reward depends on his output.
In the introduction of this paper we mentioned that we do not perform a general mechanism design analysis. Nevertheless, by the argument above, under our cost assumptions when the designer maximizes total e ort in the multiplicatively separable environment our contest with e ort-dependent reward is the optimal mechanism where the payment (transfer) rule is stochastic. 
Additively separable case
We assume now that the value function is additively separable with the form
Proposition 4 In the additively-separable environment, when the designer values the total e ort, the optimal reward is given by
where (x) is the inverse of the equilibrium e ort x( ) which is given by
and the cuto is the that maximizes the designer's pro t from the set f 2 [ ; ] :
The equilibrium e ort is the same in the additively-separable case as in the multiplicativelyseparable case when the value function is type-independent. However, the optimal reward functions are di erent in these two cases. The di erence between these cases is an added bene t for winning that depends upon in the additively-separable case. This added bene t yields additional rents for the contestant, but the induced equilibrium e ort does not in uence these rents.
Proposition 5
In the additively-separable case when the designer values the expected total e ort, 1. The equilibrium e ort is independent of the number of contestants.
2. Some contestants may not choose to participate in the contest.
3. The optimal reward is not always positive.
4. For large enough n the optimal reward is decreasing.
Proof. Equations (7) and (8) By (8) the optimal e ort is x( ) = 2 =2
Notice, that here the optimal e ort function does not depend upon n. The cuto equation is
For n = 2, this has a solution of = 4=9. By (7) this yields an optimal reward function of
Notice that the expected payment is 1145 4374 which is negative.
We can see that in the additively-separable case as in the multiplicatively-separable case, if the contest designer wishes to maximize the expected total e ort, the equilibrium e ort is independent of the number of contestants. Moreover, for a su ciently large number of contestants, the optimal reward function in both environments decreases in e ort.
On the other hand, while in the multiplicatively-separable case all contestants participate in the contest, in the additively-separable case some of them may not choose to participate in the contest. The designer is able to indirectly eliminate contestants by inducing them not to participate by setting the reward function such that a contestant with a low type will do better by not participating. Now, in order to see why it is optimal to eliminate some contestants in the additively-separable case we should examine the designer's payo which is given by
The reward function in this case can limit the participation of players for which the expression within the integral is negative. Notice that if the cost function does not depend on the contestant type, i.e., c( ; x) = x, then (8) holds for all x( ). This is because our environment is converted into the standard auction environment and revenue equivalence holds{ where pro t of the designer depends only upon which types are included determined by when
is positive. We should also note that participation is always optimal in the multiplicatively-separable environment since the expression inside the integral there, x( ) c( ;
; is always positive.
Finally, similar to before, under our assumptions when the designer maximizes total e ort in the additively-separable environment, our contest with e ort-dependent reward is the optimal mechanism. In the following section, the designer wishes to maximize the highest e ort and in this case our model would not necessarily be optimal. 8 
Maximization of the highest e ort
Assume now that the designer now cares about the expected value of the highest e ort instead of expected total e ort. In this case, his expected payo is given by
Multiplicatively separable case
We consider rst the multiplicatively-separable case where the value function is multiplicatively separable with the form V ( ; R(x)) = R(x) Proposition 6 In the multiplicatively-separable environment, when the designer values the expected highest e ort, the optimal reward is given by
As a function of the equilibrium e ort, the reward formula where the designer maximizes the highest e ort (10) is the same as in the case where the designer maximizes the total e ort (5). However, since the equilibrium e orts are not identical in both cases (equations (6) and (11) are not equal) we obtain that the optimal rewards are di erent.
It is important to notice that in the case when the designer values the expected highest e ort the optimal reward R(x) in the multiplicatively-separable environment is not comparable to any variable in the classical Principal-Agent (PA) model. Indeed, in this case the properties of the contestants' equilibrium e orts and the optimal reward are completely di erent than their properties when the designer maximizes the expected value of total effort. In particular, it is shown that in the case when the designer maximizes the expected value of total e ort, the optimal reward function decreases in e ort if the number of players is su ciently large. In this case where the designer values the highest e ort, the optimal reward may be increasing for any number of players.
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Proposition 7 In the multiplicatively-separable environment, when the designer values the expected highest e ort, 1. The equilibrium e ort depends on the number of contestants.
3. The optimal reward is always positive.
4. The optimal reward may be increasing for any number of contestants.
Proof. Equations (10) and (11) imply points 1-3. Point 4 is illustrated in the following example. Thusĉ( ; x) = x 2 = : From this speci cation, we can rewrite (11) as
This implies the equilibrium e ort
The inverse of the equilibrium e ort is (x) = (2x) 1=(n+1) : By (10) the optimal reward is then
It can be veri ed that for large n this reward approaches R(x) = x=2.
Notice that the expected highest e ort in this case is n 4n+2 while the expected highest e ort in the case where the designer maximizes the total e ort is always larger and equal to n 2n+4 : Thus, the expected payment when the designer maximizes the highest e ort must be smaller than the expected payment when the designer maximizes the total e ort, otherwise, there is a contradiction to the optimality of the reward function in this example.
Also notice that the designer's pro t in this case is
This shows that the designer's pro t is increasing in n and approaches 1=8.
10
Why now is the winning reward increasing in e ort? When the designer valued total e ort, a worker with a lower type was valued independent of the number of contestants; however, here a lower-type worker has a lower chance of having the highest type when the number of contestants increase. Hence, his e ort decreases in the number of contestants. As we see in the example, this e ort does depend upon n; (x( ) = n+1 2 ): This causes the probability of winning for a given e ort x to approach 2x. This means that we no longer have to compensate for a lower probability of winning by increasing rewards for lower e orts.
In this case since the contestants earn their informational rents and the designer gets total surplus minus the informational rents then why can't the designer use a mechanism that elicits types beforehand and requires only the highest type to expend e ort (similar to a rst-price auction)? Doing so would save having to \reimburse" losers for their expenditure and keep total surplus higher. Indeed, in some circumstances, designer have this ability. But in this paper we focus only on contest designs where the competition among the players is crucial.
Additively separable case
We assume now that the value function is additively separable with the form V ( ; R(x)) = + R(x) Proposition 8 In the additively-separable environment, when the designer values the highest e ort, the optimal reward is given by
where (x) is the inverse function of the equilibrium e ort x( ) which is given by
and the cuto is the that maximizes the designer's pro ts from the set f 2 [ ; ] :
The properties of the equilibrium e orts and the optimal reward in this case are derived as in the previous cases.
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Proposition 9 In the additively-separable environment, when the designer values the highest e ort, 1. The equilibrium e ort depends on the number of contestants.
4. The optimal reward may be increasing for any number of contestants. From this speci cation, we can rewrite (13) as
This implies the equilibrium e ort function
The inverse function is (x) = (2x) 1=(n+1) . The cuto equation is given by
For n = 2, this has a solution at = :486: As n ! 1; we have ! 0:5: The optimal reward is then
For large n this reward approaches to the increasing reward function R(x) = x 2 1.
Multiple Rewards
So far, we analyzed the optimal reward when an e ort-dependent reward R(x) is awarded only to the winner. We now extend the analysis to the case of multiple e ort-dependent rewards where the contestant with the highest e ort wins the reward R 1 (x), the contestant with the second highest e ort wins the reward R 2 (x); and so on until all the rewards are allocated. That is, R k (x) is the reward for the contestant with the k-highest e ort who exerts an e ort of x: In this extended environment we can ask what are the optimal structures and the optimal number of e ort-dependent rewards. Moldovanu and Sela (2001), using our environmental assumption of convexity of the cost function, show that it may be optimal to allocate several prizes. Since their rewards were not only xed but independent of e ort, it is interesting to examine if their result holds in our environments where the designer has more exibility.
Proposition 10 A multi-reward contest fR i (x)g i 1 has ex-ante equivalent payo s to a single reward contest
for the following environments:
is the expected reward of each contestant given the equilibrium bid function. For example, if there is only one reward, this expected value is F ( (x)) n 1 R 1 (x); and if there are two rewards, this expected value is F ( (x))
(i) the multiplicative-separable case, when a contestant of type with the k highest e ort receives payo of R k (x) :
(ii) the independent case (the payo to winning is independent of ), when a contestant of type with the k highest e ort receives payo of R k (x):
(iii) the additively-separable case, when the winner receives payo of R 1 (x) + , and the contestant of type with the k-highest e ort receives payo of R k (x) when k > 1.
The three environments are chosen to ensure that surplus is not created nor destroyed simply by the mere fact of giving a non-rst place prize { there is no intrinsic value to being runner-up.
13 Proposition 10 implies that all prize structures that have
where R(x) is the optimal reward in the case of unique dependent-e ort reward are optimal. The proof simply comes from the fact that these are substitutable in both the contestant's expected surplus and the designer's expected pro ts. And since we use both equations to eliminate the rewards (to solve for the optimal e ort) they do not appear in the form of the designer's expected payo that we maximize.
Proposition 10 shows that general all-pay contests with e ort-dependent rewards over a number of prizes have equivalence if the equilibrium bid function is monotonic. This allows us to easily analyze a range of problems including those with a disadvantage to the winner: everyone may want to try to beat the fastest gun ghter in town, the tallest building may be a clearer target for terrorism, etc.
14 In the following example we generate a peculiar example of an optimal contest with two contestants where there is only a prize for the loser.
Example 5 Consider the independent case with two contestants where the designer maximizes the total e ort. The cost function is c( ; x) = x 2 = and F is uniform on [0; 1].
In this example we have shown that the optimal reward function for the winner is R(x) = 2x=3 and the equilibrium e ort is given by (x) = p 2x: We then have
One can maintain the same revenue by giving a prize of zero to the \winner"
and an e ort-dependent reward to the loser. This would be set such that (1 (x))R 2 (x) = 13 Some other possibilities do not share this property: For example, in the additively-separable case if a contestant of type with the i-highest e ort receives R i (x) + for all i. In this case, the equivalence would disappear since giving additional prizes (say of value ) would create surplus.
14 Donald Trump is quoted as saying "Nobody is going to want to live in a building that's a target," in reference to why the proposed 115-story condominium Fordham Spire in Chicago is not economically viable. Note that he is constructing a mere 92-oor condominium skyscraper there. 
(2x)
3=2 =3: Thus, the optimal rewards are
Notice that this reaches in nity as x ! 1=2 (this is the e ort chosen by the highest type, (1=2) = 1), since there is an almost certain chance of winning and getting paid nothing.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study the design of contests when the designer has full exibility over what reward function to use. We solve our problem of nding the optimal reward by indirect means. First, we solve for the optimal e ort function. This is done by looking at the virtual cost of increasing an e ort for a speci c type. Second, we solve for the reward that induces the e ort function. We analyzed two objective functions for the designer and two value functions of the contestants. Our results from this analysis can be summarized in the following table.
Induced e ort x( ) is independent of n; x( ) is independent of n; Total E ort R 0 (x) < 0 for large n; R 0 (x) < 0 for large n;
Reward may be negative; Reward is positive; Some stay out of contest;
All contestants participate;
Induced e ort x( ) depends on n; x( ) depends on n; Max E ort May have R 0 (x) > 0 for large n; May have R 0 (x) > 0 for large n;
Reward may be negative; Reward is positive; Some stay out of contest; All contestants participate;
We then studied the possibility of multiple prizes in contests and found that it does not matter upon how many prizes the optimal reward is distributed. This was surprising given the results of Moldovanu & Sela (2001).
The most surprising result is that the reward to winning may be not only increasing, but decreasing in the e orts. It is easy to envision contests where the reward to winning is increasing in the results. These bonuses for good performances may be external rewards to winning, extra payment from the designer, or simply getting the reward sooner. On the other hand, it is not so obvious to dream up a scenario where the reward is actually decreasing in e ort. This comes in the case of contests where the reward is increasing over time. This can happen if money is raised for the winner of a contest similar to the X prize where not only is the prize money kept aside earning interest, but where the organizers continue to raise funds. The reason that this is in fact a decreasing reward is that inventing early requires a greater e ort. Thus, time and e ort are in opposite directions and while the reward is increasing over time, it is decreasing in e ort.
We conclude by suggesting a direction for future research. While the environment we study here is restricted to contests, it is possible to use the same tools to study optimal design with e ort-dependent rewards in other environments such as the classical auction mechanisms or a hybrid design where only part of the e ort is all-pay as in architectural contests. 
A Appendix

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Using the envelope theorem on the contestant's maximization problem (1) yields
Assume that all contestants with value take part in the auction and that ( ) = 0. Then by integration we obtain
From the maximization problem, we also have
The comparison of the contestant's expected payo s gives us the desired result.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Straightforward substitution of (4) into (2) implies that an equilibrium strategy x( ) must be given by the implicit function
while RHS of (14) is the expected payo of a contestant given this strategy.
Substituting (14) in the designer's expected payo (3) yields the following designer's problem
By using of integration by parts, we can rewrite the last term as follows
Thus, the designer's problem is
Since the designer is indirectly choosing x( ) through the reward function. We can look at the rst-order condition to nd the induced optimal e ort 1 +ĉ
Notice that our assumptions on c imply the same assumptions onĉ = c . These assumptions imply that as increases the LHS of (16) increases and the RHS increases. When x increases, the LHS of (16) decreases and the RHS increases. Thus, there is a monotonic solution to this equation.
Given the optimal e ort x( ); the optimal reward is obtained by changing variables from to x in equation (14) . Therefore, the optimal reward is simply
where (x) is the inverse of x( ).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Here, we prove point 4 of Proposition 3. The equilibrium e ort does not depend on the number of contestants n. The reward must be strictly positive for participation. Thus, the optimal reward given by (5) can be written as a fraction of two functions,
Then, the derivative of the reward function is given by
Since by our assumptions all the parameters here are nite, for large enough n this derivative must be negative.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The equilibrium strategy x( ) is given by the implicit function 
By substituting this reward into the designer's payo and using integration by parts, we obtain n Z x( ) c( ; x( )) + F ( ) n 1 dF n Z Z h F (~ )
The rst-order condition of this yields the optimal e ort function 1 + c x ( ; x( )) 1 F ( ) f ( ) = c x ( ; x( ))
As before, our assumptions on c satisfy the second-order conditions. The designer also has the option of having a cuto type in order to not include lower types for when the expression within the integral is negative. It is important to notice that this expression within the integral does not necessarily increases in :
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Here we prove point 4 of Proposition 5. Since the optimal equilibrium e ort is the same as in the multiplicatively-separable case when the value function is type-independent, the di erence between the two rewards is that now the reward is larger by
The derivative of this with respect to x is
Thus, the reward is also decreasing for large n.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
As in the case of maximization of total e ort, we can use equation (14) to substitute for F ( ) n 1 R(x( )) in the designer's expected payo (9) and use integration by parts to simplify. Now the designer's expected payo becomes
The rst-order condition of this yields the optimal (pro t-maximizing) x( )
Since F n 1 ( ) is increasing in , the same arguments as before guarantees a monotonic solution. From equation (14), we nd the optimal reward:
R(x) = ĉ( (x); x)
where (x) is the inverse of x( ) that satis es (20).
A.7 Proof of Proposition 10
We can rewrite the contestant's expected surplus, (14) and (17), as the following two equations (the rst holds for environments (1) and (2), while the second holds for environment The designer's payo changes from (3) and (9) to the following two formulas, respectively,
When we use the contestant's surplus equations to substitute for the expected rewards in the above two formulas (depending upon the environment and whether the designer's goal is total or maximum e ort), we arrive at exactly the same formulas for the designer's payo as before: (15), (19) and (18). Thus, both the induced e ort and the respective payo s will remain the same.
